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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had a very quiet 
year in terms of trademark decisions, issuing only four decisions in 
2013.1  This number is a notable decline from the Federal Circuit’s 
                                                          
  This Area Summary reflects the Authors’ current thoughts on the subject 
matter and should not be attributed, in whole or in part, to Morgan, Lewis & 
Bockius, LLP or any of its clients.  This Area Summary is not meant to convey legal 
opinions or legal advice of any kind. 
  Partner, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP; J.D., American University, Washington 
College of Law, 1996; B.A., Jewish and Near Eastern Studies, Washington University, 
1993.  Ms. Polott was the Note & Comment Editor of the American University Law 
Review during law school. 
  Associate, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP; J.D., American University, Washington 
College of Law, 2011; B.A., Political Science and Criminology, University of Florida, 
2005.  Ms. Justus was the Editor-in-Chief of the American University Intellectual Property 
Brief during law school. 
 1. See In re City of Hous., 731 F.3d 1326, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding that 
section 2(b) of the Lanham Act prohibited the City of Houston and the District of 
Columbia from registering their city seals on the Federal Register), cert. denied, 134 S. 
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output on trademark decisions2 in past years, which included thirteen 
trademark decisions in 2012,3 six in 2011,4 and twenty-three in 2010.5  
This year’s decrease in trademark decisions cannot be attributed to a 
significant decrease in the court’s caseload, as its overall docket for 
Fiscal Year 20136 was down only slightly from previous years, with 
1259 appeals filed as compared to 1381 in Fiscal Year 2012 and 1349 
in Fiscal Year 2011.7  However, the percentage of appeals pertaining 
to trademark law that were filed with the court this year was generally 
consistent with previous years, as two percent of this year’s 
approximately 1259 appeals pertained to trademark law.8  Substantive 
trademark decisions have not made up more than three percent of 
                                                          
Ct. 1325 (2014); In re Health Sci. Funding, LLC, 538 F. App’x 898, 899 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) (affirming the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board’s (TTAB or “the Board”) finding that the marks PRASTERONE.ORG and 
THE PRASTERONE COMPANY were generic and could not be registered); Levi 
Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 719 F.3d 1367, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) (holding that litigation in district court did not preclude Levi Strauss & Co. 
from bringing a registration challenge to the TTAB because the registrations at issue 
covered a broader scope of goods than the district court litigation addressed); Wax v. 
Amazon Techs., Inc., 500 F. App’x 944, 946–47 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per curiam) 
(holding that a likelihood of confusion existed between the marks AMAZON 
VENTURES and AMAZON.COM). 
 2. This Area Summary uses the term “trademark decisions” to refer to decisions 
that substantively address claims under the Lanham (Trademark) Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1051–1141n (2012).  Practitioners should be aware that this Area Summary is a 
survey only of the 2013 trademark decisions issued by the Federal Circuit that 
substantively address Lanham Act claims and that other opinions issued by the 
Federal Circuit this year may also impact trademark law practice but are not 
considered or discussed herein. 
 3. See Molly R. Silfen et al., 2012 Trademark Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 62 
AM. U. L. REV. 991, 992 (2013) (noting that eleven of the thirteen 2012 trademark 
decisions were precedential). 
 4. See Marynelle Wilson & Antigone Peyton, 2011 Trademark Law Decisions of the 
Federal Circuit, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1151, 1152 (2012) (theorizing that the economic 
environment and a diminished number of trademark applications in 2009 and 2010 
may have caused a decline in the number of trademark cases before the court). 
 5. See Susan B. Flohr et al., 2010 Trademark Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 60 
AM. U. L. REV. 1159, 1160, 1162 (2011) (highlighting that out of six per curiam cases, 
the court affirmed the TTAB’s decisions five times without written opinions). 
 6. Although the term “Fiscal Year 2013” refers to the period between October 1, 
2012, and September 30, 2013, see Fiscal Year Definition, U.S. SENATE, 
http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/fiscal_year.htm (last visited May 1, 
2014), the caseload statistics during that timeframe shed light on the number of 
cases filed in 2013. 
 7. See United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit:  Historical Caseload, U.S. 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories 
/Statistics/historical%20caseload%20graph%2083-13.pdf (last visited May 1, 2014) 
(illustrating the court’s caseload since Fiscal Year 1983 and illustrating that the lowest 
number of appeals per year in recent history was 1208 in Fiscal Year 2010). 
 8. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit:  Appeals Filed, by Category (FY 
2013), U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images 
/stories/Statistics/fy%2013%20filings%20by%20category.pdf (last visited May 1, 2014). 
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the Federal Circuit’s caseload in the past eight years.9  Despite its 
relative quiet on the trademark front this year, the Federal Circuit 
weighed in on several issues of note to the practice of trademark law 
in its four 2013 decisions, each of which is discussed in detail below. 
I. SUBSTANTIVE TRADEMARK ISSUES 
The court issued three decisions discussing substantive trademark 
issues in 2013, including a case of first impression on the registrability 
of government seals.10 
A. Likelihood of Confusion:  Wax v. Amazon Technologies, Inc. 
In the first Federal Circuit trademark opinion of 2013, Wax v. 
Amazon Technologies, Inc.,11 the court affirmed the Trademark Trial 
and Appeal Board (TTAB or “the Board”) of the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) decision sustaining the opposition to an 
application to register the mark AMAZON VENTURES for 
investment management services based on existing registrations for 
the famous AMAZON.COM marks.12 
Jeffrey S. Wax, a patent attorney and venture capitalist, filed an 
intent-to-use application in 2000 for the mark AMAZON VENTURES 
(with VENTURES disclaimed) for “investment management, raising 
venture capital for others, . . . and capital investment consultation.”13  
The application’s publication was delayed for eight years14 due to the 
number of prior pending applications for various AMAZON.COM 
marks owned by the online retailer Amazon Technologies, Inc. 
                                                          
 9. See Statistics, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIR., 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/statistics.html (follow “2006” to “2013” 
hyperlinks under “Caseload, by Category”) (demonstrating that during this time 
period, trademark decisions have comprised between approximately one and three 
percent of the Federal Circuit’s caseload). 
 10. See In re City of Hous., 731 F.3d 1326, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (registrability of 
government seals), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1325 (2014); In re Health Sci. Funding, 
LLC, 538 F. App’x 898, 899 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (registrability of PRASTERONE.ORG 
and THE PRASTERONE COMPANY); Wax v. Amazon Techs., Inc., 500 F. App’x 944, 
945 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (registrability of AMAZON VENTURES). 
 11. 500 F. App’x 944 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per curiam). 
 12. Id. at 945. 
 13. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 14. Wax’s intent-to-use application was not published until 2008, eight years after 
filing.  Notice of Publication Under 12(a) from Commissioner for Trademarks, U.S. 
Patent & Trademark Office, to Jeffrey S. Wax, Applicant (June 4, 2008), available at 
http://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?caseId=sn78001126&docId=NOP2008060409
2535 (notifying the applicant that the AMAZON VENTURES Mark, U.S. Trademark 
Application Serial No. 78,001,126 (filed Mar. 27, 2000), “appears to be entitled to 
registration” pending any third-party objection during the 30-day publication period). 
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(“Amazon”), which eventually either proceeded to registration15 or 
were abandoned.16  Amazon opposed the AMAZON VENTURES 
application upon publication, claiming priority and alleging a 
likelihood of confusion and dilution.17  Amazon based its priority 
claim on a number of its AMAZON.COM registered marks covering 
various financial and business services as well as its common law 
rights in marks containing “AMAZON.”18  The TTAB sustained 
Amazon’s opposition, finding that Amazon had established priority 
on the basis of its pleaded registrations and common law use and 
holding that consumers were likely to be confused between 
AMAZON VENTURES and the AMAZON.COM marks.19  Because the 
TTAB held for Amazon on its likelihood of confusion claim, it did 
not reach Amazon’s dilution claim.20 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decision, first holding 
that it correctly determined that Amazon’s AMAZON.COM marks 
had priority over AMAZON VENTURES.21  Wax argued that Amazon 
could not establish priority because the USPTO had denied 
Amazon’s application to register AMAZON.COM for “financial 
management [and] financial planning services” after Wax filed the 
AMAZON VENTURES application.22  However, the Federal Circuit 
noted that Amazon owned several other registrations for 
AMAZON.COM marks with earlier filing dates than AMAZON 
VENTURES, including registrations for various advertising, business 
management, and credit card services.23  Therefore, the fact that 
Amazon’s host of AMAZON.COM registrations did not specifically 
cover financial services did not negate the priority of its marks for a 
variety of related business services.24 
                                                          
 15. The following Amazon-owned applications proceeded to registration:  (1) 
AMAZON.COM AUCTIONS, covering “commodity trading for others”; (2) 
AMAZON.COM, covering “credit card services; and charge card services”; and (3) 
AMAZON.COM Plus Design, covering “credit card services; and charge card 
services.”  Amazon Techs., Inc. v. Wax, Opposition No. 91187118, 2012 WL 1267957, 
at *4 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 30, 2012), aff’d per curiam, 500 F. App’x 944.  The registration for 
AMAZON.COM AUCTIONS has since been cancelled.  See AMAZON.COM 
AUCTIONS, Serial No. 75,669,200 (cancelled July 13, 2012). 
 16. Amazon expressly abandoned its application for the mark AMAZON 
FINANCIAL SERVICES, covering various mutual fund and securities services, in 
October 2004.  AMAZON FINANCIAL SERVICES, Serial No. 75,677,294 (abandoned 
Oct. 5, 2004). 
 17. Wax, 500 F. App’x at 945–46. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Wax, 2012 WL 1267957, at *9–10. 
 20. Id. at *11. 
 21. Wax, 500 F. App’x at 946. 
 22. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
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The Federal Circuit then examined the TTAB’s decision that 
Wax’s AMAZON VENTURES mark was likely to cause confusion 
with Amazon’s AMAZON.COM marks.25  First, the court agreed 
with the Board’s findings that Amazon’s marks were very strong 
due to their commercial fame and inherent distinctiveness with 
regard to Amazon’s services.26  Wax attempted to argue on appeal 
that Amazon could only prove fame for the full mark 
AMAZON.COM, rather than the AMAZON term alone, and that 
his AMAZON VENTURES mark was not confusingly similar to 
AMAZON.COM when considered as a whole.27 
The Federal Circuit rejected these distinctions, first holding that 
AMAZON was the predominant aspect of Amazon’s marks because 
AMAZON and AMAZON.COM were used interchangeably to refer to 
the company’s services.28  The court also noted that Wax did not 
argue against the TTAB’s finding that the VENTURES portion of his 
mark was merely descriptive of his financial services (and indeed, 
Wax had accepted the USPTO’s request to disclaim VENTURES 
during the application’s prosecution period).29  Given that Wax 
accepted and did not argue against disclaiming VENTURES, the 
AMAZON portion of the mark was given even more weight in the 
TTAB’s analysis.30  Further, Wax’s argument that the differences 
between his and Amazon’s services and channels of trade weighed 
against a likelihood of confusion also failed, as owners of a famous 
mark such as AMAZON.COM “enjoy a wide latitude of protection” 
and do not have to prove that the parties provide the same services in 
order to establish a likelihood of confusion.31  The Federal Circuit 
held that the Board did not err in its conclusion that the likelihood 
of confusion factors from In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.32 as a 
                                                          
 25. Id. at 947. 
 26. Id. at 946–47. 
 27. Id. at 947. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See id. 
 31. Id. at 947–48 (quoting Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000)). 
 32. 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  The DuPont court held that the following 
factors should be considered in a likelihood-of-confusion analysis: 
(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to 
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.  (2) The 
similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods . . . as described in an 
application or registration or in connection with which a prior mark is in 
use.  (3) The similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade 
channels.  (4) The conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are 
made, i.e. “impulse” vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.  (5) The fame of 
the prior mark . . . .  (6) The number and nature of similar marks in use on 
TRADEMARK.FINALTECH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/2014  5:24 PM 
1424 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:1419 
whole strongly supported Amazon’s position and affirmed the 
decision sustaining Amazon’s opposition of AMAZON VENTURES.33 
B. Genericness:  In re Health Science Funding, LLC 
The Federal Circuit tackled the issue of genericness in In re Health 
Science Funding, LLC.34  The court affirmed the TTAB’s decision that 
the marks PRASTERONE.ORG and THE PRASTERONE COMPANY 
were generic for a website featuring information about prasterone 
drugs and related topics.35 
Health Science Funding, LLC (“Health Science”) applied in March 
2011 to register the marks PRASTERONE.ORG and THE 
PRASTERONE COMPANY (“the PRASTERONE marks”) on the 
Supplemental Register for website informational services on the topic 
of prasterone scientific and clinical research.36  The examining 
attorney refused registration on the basis that the proposed marks 
were generic for the services covered by the application and were 
therefore not capable of distinguishing applicant’s services—a 
decision that the TTAB later affirmed.37 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decision that the 
PRASTERONE marks were generic for information services 
regarding prasterone, which is undisputedly a generic term for 
synthetic dehydroepiandroesterone (“DHEA”).38  The court began its 
analysis by noting that the USPTO bears the heightened “clear 
evidence” burden of proof for establishing that a proposed mark is 
generic.39  Health Science first attempted to argue that the services at 
issue should be characterized as “publication services” and that there 
was no evidence that the PRASTERONE marks were generic for such 
                                                          
similar goods.  (7) The nature and extent of any actual confusion.  (8) The 
length of time during and conditions under which there has been 
concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion.  (9) The variety of 
goods on which a mark is or is not used . . . .  (10) The market interface 
between applicant and the owner of a prior mark . . . .  (11) The extent to 
which applicant has a right to exclude others from use of its mark on its 
goods.  (12) The extent of potential confusion . . . .  (13) Any other 
established fact probative of the effect of use. 
Id. at 1361. 
 33. Wax, 500 F. App’x at 948. 
 34. 538 F. App’x 898 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 35. Id. at 899. 
 36. In re Health Sci. Funding, LLC, Nos. 85255510, 85255541, 2012 WL 4763146, 
at *1 & nn.2–3 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 19, 2012), aff’d, 538 F. App’x 898. 
 37. Health Sci., 538 F. App’x at 899; see 15 U.S.C. § 1091(c) (2012) (providing that 
a word “must be capable of distinguishing the applicant’s goods or services” in order 
to be registered on the Supplemental Register). 
 38. Health Sci., 538 F. App’x at 900–02. 
 39. Id. at 900. 
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services.40  The Federal Circuit quickly dismissed this argument, 
noting that the Board correctly classified the services at issue as 
“information services.”41  The court further described the services as 
relying on the exact description Health Science included in its 
applications for the PRASTERONE marks—“providing a website 
featuring scientific and clinical research information about 
investigational medical foods, dietary supplements or drugs, namely, 
prasterone or derivatives or analogs thereof.”42 
The Federal Circuit also rejected Health Science’s interpretation 
of the TTAB’s opinion as improperly holding that “genericness in 
one class of goods or services is sufficient to establish genericness 
for another class,” which would contradict Federal Circuit 
precedent.43  The court noted that although the Board did state 
that “because ‘prasterone’ is the generic name of one of the items 
that is the subject matter of applicant’s services, it is likewise 
generic for the services themselves,” the TTAB’s analysis “did not 
stop there.”44  More significantly, the Board examined each 
individual component of both PRASTERONE marks, noting the 
undisputed facts that prasterone is generic for synthetic DHEA 
and that “.org” and the word “company” are considered generic 
terms.45  The Federal Circuit agreed with the Board’s finding that 
the evidence on record showed that the term “prasterone” is 
frequently used with informational websites on the subject of 
prasterone and related scientific and medical information.46  The 
Federal Circuit therefore concluded that the TTAB correctly 
found that the addition of “.org” and “company” was not enough 
to elevate the generic term prasterone to a registrable mark.47 
Similarly, the Federal Circuit rejected Health Science’s reliance on 
In re Steelbuilding.com,48 in which the Federal Circuit held that the 
Board had mistakenly read a finding of genericness in one class of 
goods or services to imply that another class was also generic.49  The 
Health Science court found Steelbuilding.com distinguishable because the 
Board made several reversible errors in that case, including too 
                                                          
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 900–01. 
 42. Id. at 900. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 901. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 902. 
 47. Id. 
 48. 415 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 49. Id. at 1298–99; see Health Sci., 538 F. App’x at 901. 
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narrowly construing the genus of the applicant’s goods and services.50  
The Board did not make such errors in Health Science.51  As the court 
noted, the Board’s analysis correctly tracked Federal Circuit 
precedent from In re Hotels.com, L.P.,52 in which the court affirmed 
the Board’s holding that the mark HOTELS.COM was generic for 
hotel information and reservations made via the Internet.53  After 
finding that the Board’s genericness analysis was correct, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the refusal to register the PRASTERONE marks.54 
C. Government Entity Seals/Insignia:  In re City of Houston 
In a combined precedential opinion, the Federal Circuit upheld 
the TTAB’s section 2(b) refusals to register the government seals of 
the City of Houston and the District of Columbia in two cases on 
appeal from the Director of the USPTO.55 
Section 2(b) of the Lanham Act prohibits the registration of any 
trademark that “[c]onsists of or comprises the flag or coat of arms or 
other insignia of the United States, or of any State or municipality, or 
of any foreign nation, or any simulation thereof.”56  The District of 
Columbia (“the District”) applied in January 200957 to register its 
official seal for a variety of goods, including shirts, pens, cups, and 
hats, while the City of Houston (“Houston”) applied the following 
month to register its city seal for various municipal and city services.58 
Examining attorneys refused both applications on the basis that 
section 2(b) prohibits the federal registration of government seals 
and insignia, and both applicants unsuccessfully appealed to the 
TTAB.59  The Federal Circuit combined the appeals as an issue of first 
impression as to whether section 2(b) bars a state or local 
government entity from registering its own insignia.60  Each appellant 
presented a strikingly different theory to support its argument that 
section 2(b) did not bar such registrations.61 
                                                          
 50. Health Sci., 538 F. App’x at 901. 
 51. Id. 
 52. 573 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 53. Id. at 1301; see Health Sci., 538 F. App’x at 901. 
 54. Health Sci., 538 F. App’x at 902. 
 55. See In re City of Hous., 731 F.3d 1326, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 1325 (2014). 
 56. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(b) (2012). 
 57. See U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,643,857 (filed Jan. 6, 2009). 
 58. City of Hous., 731 F.3d at 1329. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 1328. 
 61. See id. at 1330–32 (explaining that Houston focused on the legislative 
intent underlying the definition of the term “applicant,” while the District relied 
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The Federal Circuit began its analysis with Houston’s argument 
that it should be allowed to register its city seal because government 
entities are not “applicants” barred by the prohibitions of section 2.62  
As the basis for its theory, Houston proposed that section 45 of the 
Lanham Act defines the term “person” as pertaining to an applicant 
to include both a natural person and “a ‘juristic person,’ which 
includes any ‘organization capable of suing and being sued in a court 
of law.’”63  Because section 45 begins with a caveat that all definitions 
are set forth therein “unless the contrary is plainly apparent from the 
context,”64 Houston argued that section 2(b)’s context indicated that 
Congress intended for the term “applicant” to exclude a government 
entity attempting to register its own seal or insignia.65  In support of 
this legislative intent argument, Houston contended that 
unauthorized use of government insignia leads to confusion among 
the public as to whether the goods and services bearing such insignia 
are actually sponsored by or affiliated with the government.66  
Houston also argued that the bar on government registration of its 
insignia frustrates public policy, as the goal of the Lanham Act is to 
protect the consuming public from “pirates and cheats.”67 
The Federal Circuit rejected this interpretation of the legislative 
history of the Lanham Act, noting that the Supreme Court’s decisions 
in Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc.68 and United States v. 
Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co.69 strongly supported statutory 
construction based on the plain language of the statute unless “rare 
and exceptional circumstances” required a deeper analysis into 
Congress’s intentions.70  The Federal Circuit did not find such 
circumstances in City of Houston, as it concluded that nothing in the 
plain language of section 2(b) indicated that a government entity is 
exempt from this prohibition.71  Further, the court noted that section 
45 plainly contemplates that “applicant” can encompass a 
                                                          
upon the alleged congressional desire to implement the treaty rights recognized 
in the Paris Convention). 
 62. Id. at 1330. 
 63. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012)). 
 64. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
 65. City of Hous., 731 F.3d at 1330. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 79-219, at 2 (1945)). 
 68. 469 U.S. 189 (1985). 
 69. 553 U.S. 1 (2008). 
 70. City of Hous., 731 F.3d at 1330–31 (quoting Clintwood Elkhorn, 553 U.S. at 11); 
see also Park ‘N Fly, 469 U.S. at 194 (asserting that statutory construction begins with 
“the assumption that the ordinary meaning of [the statutory] language accurately 
expresses the legislative purpose”). 
 71. City of Hous., 731 F.3d at 1331 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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government entity, as the provision sets forth a list of government 
entities such as “‘the United States,’ ‘any State,’ and ‘any 
instrumentality of a State’” as examples of entities covered by the 
term.72  According to the court, the City of Houston would certainly 
fall into this category.73  Other provisions of section 2 of the Lanham 
Act include express exceptions,74 which the Court viewed as an 
indication that if Congress had intended for section 2(b) to permit 
state and local government registration of its own insignia, it would 
have expressly provided for such an exemption.75  Although the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s holding that the examining 
attorney properly refused Houston’s registration of its city seal, it 
noted that Houston had other options for preventing fraudulent and 
potentially confusing use of its insignia.76  For example, the city could 
pass an ordinance banning such activity or appeal to Congress to 
amend section 2(b).77 
The District took a very different but equally unsuccessful 
approach in its appeal, arguing that denying government entities the 
ability to register their official seals and insignia violated the United 
States’ obligations under Article 6 of the Paris Convention.78  To 
position this analysis, the District first argued that the language of 
section 2(b) is ambiguous79 and that therefore, courts could examine 
its legislative history and congressional intent.80  This contention led 
the District to its theory that Article 6 of the Paris Convention 
requires member countries to allow for the trademark registration of 
                                                          
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. For example, section 2(c) prohibits the registration of a trademark that 
“[c]onsists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular 
living individual except by his written consent, or the name, signature, or portrait of a 
deceased President of the United States during the life of his widow, if any, except by 
the written consent of the widow.”  15 U.S.C. § 1052(c) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 75. City of Hous., 731 F.3d at 1331. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1331–32; see Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 
art. 6, Mar. 20, 1883, revised July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, 325 
[hereinafter Paris Convention].  The Paris Convention is a global intellectual 
property treaty that established a “Union” of member countries for the protection of 
industrial property.  See Summary of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property (1883), WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/ 
en/ip/paris/summary_paris.html (last visited May 1, 2014) (summarizing the 
creation and goals of the Paris Convention).  Article 6 of the Paris Convention 
provides for the consistent recognition of registered trademarks among member 
countries.  See Paris Convention, supra, 21 U.S.T. at 1639–46, 828 U.N.T.S. at 324–33. 
 79. City of Hous., 731 F.3d at 1332.  The District set forth that section 2(b)’s 
language is not plain on its face because the USPTO has previously allowed for the 
registration of three government seals.  Id. at 1332 & n.1. 
 80. Id. at 1332. 
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official insignia that are registered in other countries.81  The Federal 
Circuit again disagreed with the contention that the language of 
section 2(b) is ambiguous but held that even if the language did 
allow for an examination of statutory construction, the District’s Paris 
Convention theory did not pass muster.82  Article 6quinquies83 of the 
Paris Convention provides that “[e]very trademark duly registered in 
the country of origin shall be accepted for filing and protected as is 
in the other countries of the [Paris Convention] Union, subject to 
the reservations indicated in this Article.”84  However, Article 6ter85 
modifies the general rule of 6quinquies with the caveat that the 
member countries agree to refuse or to invalidate the registration of 
trademarks that are comprised “of armorial bearings, flags, and other 
State emblems, of countries of the Union.”86  Therefore, the Federal 
Circuit found that these Articles relate to emblems of countries, 
rather than those of local public bodies and cities.87  The District is 
not “a country of the Union,” so its seal would not fall under the 
protections of the Paris Convention.88  The court also pointed out 
that the Paris Convention applies to trademarks that are already “duly 
registered in the country of origin,” a category under which the 
District’s trademark application did not fall.89 
The Federal Circuit’s suggestion that the appellants in City of 
Houston had other options at their disposal if they disagreed with the 
Lanham Act’s prohibition on the registration of government indicia 
did not go unheard.  Two months after the court issued its decision 
in City of Houston, several members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives and Senate introduced a bipartisan bill urging 
Congress to amend the Lanham Act and allow the United States 
federal, state, and local governments to register their “flag[s], coat[s] 
                                                          
 81. Id. at 1334. 
 82. See id. at 1333 (asserting to the contrary that section 2(b)’s language “is quite 
plain on its face”). 
 83. The suffix “-quinquies” is a Latin suffix meaning, in this context, the “fifth 
subsection.”  Id. at 1334 n.2. 
 84. Id. at 1334 (quoting Paris Convention, supra note 78, 21 U.S.T. at 1643, 828 
U.N.T.S. at 331). 
 85. The suffix “-ter” means the “third subsection.”  Id. at 1334 n.2. 
 86. Id. at 1334 (quoting Paris Convention, supra note 78, 21 U.S.T. at 1640, 828 
U.N.T.S. at 327). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. (quoting the District of Columbia Organic Act of 1871, 16 Stat. 419 
(1871), which declares that the District “constitute[s] a body corporate for municipal 
purposes, and may . . . have a seal, and exercise all the powers of a municipal 
corporation”). 
 89. See id. at 1335 (quoting Paris Convention, supra note 78, 21 U.S.T. at 1643, 
828 U.N.T.S. at 331) (noting that this rationale would be “circular,” since answering 
the question at issue—whether the mark can be registered in the United States—in 
the affirmative is the very requirement necessary for Article 6quinquies to apply). 
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of arms, or other official insignia” with the USPTO.90  The bill, which 
was introduced in the House and referred to the House Judiciary 
Committee on December 12, 2013, would add an exception to 
section 2(b), which currently states: 
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be 
distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration 
on the principal register on account of its nature unless it . . . 
[c]onsists of or comprises the flag or coat of arms or other insignia 
of the United States, or of any State or municipality, or of any 
foreign nation, or any simulation thereof.91 
The bill would add to the end of this provision the exception that 
“this subsection shall not prevent the United States, or any State, 
municipality, county, political subdivision, or other governmental 
authority in the United States, from obtaining registration under this 
Act of any mark that consists of or comprises its own flag, coat of 
arms, or other official insignia.”92  If enacted, trademark practitioners 
could expect a host of applications by state and local government 
entities seeking to protect their respective seals and indicia. 
II. PROCEDURAL TRADEMARK ISSUES 
The court issued one procedural trademark law decision in 2013, 
which discussed the potentially far-reaching implications of claim and 
issue preclusion. 
A. Claim/Issue Preclusion:  Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch 
Trading Co. 
In its sole trademark procedural decision of the year, Levi Strauss & 
Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co.,93 the Federal Circuit reversed 
the TTAB’s decision that district court litigation precludes USPTO 
opposition and cancellation proceedings.  In this important decision, 
the court thereby opened the door to trademark registration 
challenges by unsuccessful district court litigants.94 
Appellee Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co. (“Abercrombie”) 
created a “mirror image stitching design” (“the Abercrombie 
Design”) for use on a line of jeans sold in its Ruehl brand stores and 
obtained registration (“the Abercrombie Design Registration”) of its 
design for “[c]lothing, namely, jeans, skirts, [and] pants” on the 
                                                          
 90. S. 1816, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 3713, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 91. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012). 
 92. S. 1816, 113th Cong. § 1; H.R. 3713, 113th Cong. § 1. 
 93. 719 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 94. Id. at 1369. 
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Supplemental Register.95  Abercombie’s application to register its 
design was refused registration on the Principal Register after the 
examining attorney held that the mark was “merely a decorative or 
ornamental feature of the goods” and therefore was incapable of 
serving the source-indicating function of a trademark on the 
Principal Register.96  Abercrombie amended the application to seek 
registration on the Supplemental Register after failing to persuade 
the examining attorney that the mark should be registered on the 
Principal Register.97 
While the application for the Abercrombie Design Registration was 
pending, Abercrombie filed an application (the “Abercrombie 
Design Application”) for the Abercrombie Design covering 
“[c]lothing, namely, jeans, skirts, shorts, pants and jackets” to the 
Principal Register.98  Upon publication of the Abercrombie Design 
Application, Appellant Levi Strauss & Co. (“Levi Strauss”) filed an 
opposition to the Abercrombie Design Application and a petition to 
cancel the Abercrombie Design Application.99  Levi Strauss based its 
opposition and cancellation petition on its “Arcuate” stitching 
trademark (“the Arcuate Design”), for which it owned four federal 
trademark registrations and claimed use dating from 1873.100 
                                                          
 95. Registration No. 3,451,669; see Levi Strauss, 719 F.3d at 1368–69. 
 96. See Office Action from Caroline E. Wood, Trademark Examining Attorney, 
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, to Kathryn M. Wheble, Counsel to Applicant 
Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co. (Feb. 22, 2008), available at http://tsdr.uspto.gov 
/documentviewer?caseId=sn78977782&docId=OOA20080222090744. 
 97. See Request for Reconsideration After Final Action from Reid M. Wilson and 
Christine B. Redfield, Attorney of Record, to Commissioner for Trademarks, U.S. 
Patent & Trademark Office (May 1, 2008), http://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?case 
Id=sn78977782&docId=RFR20080502170254 (requesting reconsideration of the 
examining attorney’s final action with respect to U.S. Trademark Application Serial 
No. 78,977,782). 
 98. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,977,782; see Levi Strauss, 719 F.3d at 1369. 
 99. Levi Strauss, 719 F.3d at 1369. 
 100. Id.; see Registration No. 0,404,248 (issuing November 16, 1943, for use on 
“waistband type overalls”); Registration No. 1,139,254 (issuing on September 2, 1980, 
for use on “pants, jackets, skirts, and shorts”); Registration No. 2,791,156 (issuing on 
December 9, 2003, for use on “pants, jeans, shorts, shirts, t-shirts, blouses, skirts and 
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Shortly thereafter, Levi Strauss sued Abercrombie in the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that 
the Abercrombie Design infringed and diluted its Arcuate Design.101  
The USPTO suspended Levi Strauss’s opposition and cancellation 
proceedings pending resolution of the suit.102  The district court held 
in separate decisions that the Abercrombie Design, which only 
appeared on jeans sold in Abercrombie’s Ruehl stores, did not 
infringe or dilute Levi Strauss’s Arcuate Design given the disparate 
channels of trade and price points for the parties’ respective jeans 
(“the 2009 Infringement Judgment” and “the 2009 Dilution 
Judgment,” respectively).103  Levi Strauss appealed the district 
court’s dilution decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, which reversed and remanded on the basis that the lower 
court erroneously relied on the standard that the marks at issue 
                                                          
jackets”); Registration No. 2,794,649 (issuing on December 16, 2003, for use on 
“pants, jeans, shorts, shirts, t-shirts, blouses, skirts and jackets”). 
 101. Levi Strauss, 719 F.3d at 1369; Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch 
Trading Co., 548 F. Supp. 2d 811, 812 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 102. Levi Strauss, 719 F.3d at 1369. 
 103. Id. at 1370; see Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., No. 
07-03752 JSW, 2009 WL 1082175 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2009) (judgment on trademark 
dilution and trademark infringement), rev’d, 633 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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must be “identical or nearly identical” in order for dilution by 
blurring to occur.104 
Further complicating matters, Abercrombie ultimately 
discontinued its Ruehl brand during the appeal but then filed a new 
trademark application for the Abercrombie Design covering 
“clothing, namely bottoms” in connection with its recently 
announced Gilly Hicks brand.105  On remand to the district court, 
Levi Strauss, concerned that the Gilly Hicks products were priced 
closer to Levi Strauss’s price points, asked Abercrombie to amend the 
pleadings or augment the record to address the Gilly Hicks product 
line.106  Abercrombie refused, and the district court declined Levi 
Strauss’s motion to amend its complaint without explanation.107  
Soon after, Levi Strauss voluntarily moved to dismiss its dilution 
claim, which the district court granted with prejudice (the “2011 
Final Dilution Judgment”).108 
After the district court suit was dismissed, Abercrombie filed 
motions for summary judgment in the USPTO opposition and 
cancellation proceedings, arguing that Levi Strauss’s challenges were 
barred by both claim preclusion and issue preclusion.109  The Board 
disagreed with Abercrombie’s claim preclusion argument, holding 
that the doctrine did not apply because of the “significant 
differences” between the facts required to establish infringement in a 
district court case and those required to oppose a trademark 
application or cancel a registration.110  However, the Board agreed 
that the elements of issue preclusion barred Levi Strauss’s claims and 
granted summary judgment to Abercrombie.111  Levi Strauss appealed 
to the Federal Circuit.112 
                                                          
 104. Levi Strauss, 633 F.3d at 1174 (quoting Levi Strauss, 2009 WL 1082175, at *9). 
 105. Levi Strauss, 719 F.3d at 1370. 
 106. Id.  Although the court’s decision refers to Abercrombie’s “Gilley Hicks” 
brand, the correct spelling of the brand as used by both parties is “Gilly Hicks,” 
which this Area Summary uses. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 1370–71.  The doctrine of claim preclusion prevents a litigant from 
raising issues in a subsequent suit that should have been raised in the first action if 
there was a judgment on the merits in the first action and the actions share the 
“same cause of action” involving the same transactional facts.  Id. at 1371 (quoting 
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979)).  Issue preclusion bars a 
subsequent action for issues that have already been fully litigated in an earlier suit 
where the earlier determination was necessary to the judgment in that suit.  Id. 
 110. Id. at 1371; Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 
Opposition No. 91175601, 2012 WL 1267965, at *4 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 29, 2012), rev’d, 
719 F.3d 1367. 
 111. Levi Strauss, 719 F.3d at 1371; Levi Strauss, 2012 WL 1267965, at *7. 
 112. Levi Strauss, 719 F.3d at 1371. 
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The Federal Circuit reversed the TTAB’s decision, holding that Levi 
Strauss’s registration challenges were not barred by claim or issue 
preclusion.113  The court began by noting that a reversed judgment 
cannot support preclusion of either type and that the Ninth Circuit 
reversed both the 2009 Dilution Judgment and the district court’s 
findings accompanying the judgment.114  These reversals left both the 
2009 Infringement Judgment and the 2011 Final Dilution Judgment as 
possible bases for the preclusion analysis.115 
With respect to issue preclusion, the Federal Circuit found that the 
2011 Final Dilution Judgment resulted from Levi Strauss’s voluntary 
dismissal.116  The 2011 Final Dilution Judgment could be considered 
an adjudication on the merits as required for claim preclusion.117  It 
was not, however, a decision on any “issue” in the suit and therefore 
could not be used as a basis for issue preclusion.118  The court 
observed that the 2009 Infringement Judgment was therefore the 
only remaining basis for issue preclusion and that this judgment was 
decided on the merits.119  However, the court previously held that the 
2009 Infringement Judgment could not bar Levi Strauss’s TTAB 
actions given the widely disparate set of issues between Levi Strauss’s 
TTAB opposition and cancellation proceedings and those presented 
to the district court.120  The TTAB proceedings were based on the 
Abercrombie Design Application and required an analysis of all of 
the goods sought in the application.121  In contrast, the district court 
infringement suit focused on whether Abercrombie’s marketing of its 
specific Ruehl-brand jeans featuring the Abercrombie Design was 
likely to cause confusion with Levi Strauss’s Arcuate Design.122  This 
difference in the scope of issues meant that Levi Strauss’s TTAB 
claims were not barred by issue preclusion and that the Board erred 
in its ruling on this aspect.123 
The Federal Circuit also reversed the Board’s dismissal on the 
alternative ground that Levi Strauss’s challenges at the USPTO were 
                                                          
 113. Id. at 1369, 1371. 
 114. Id. at 1372. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. (clarifying that because the judgment was a voluntary dismissal with 
prejudice, it amounted to a decision on the merits for claim- but not issue-preclusion 
purposes). 
 118. Id. at 1372–73. 
 119. Id. at 1373. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 1373–74. 
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barred by claim preclusion.124  Claim preclusion requires an identity 
of parties, a final judgment on the merits, and the same transactional 
facts; in this case, the parties were identical, and the 2009 
Infringement Judgment and the 2011 Final Dilution Judgment were 
both judgments on the merits.125  Thus, the Board erred in holding 
that the transactional facts in the USPTO challenges were the same as 
those weighed by the district court.126  With regard to the 2009 
Infringement Judgment, the Federal Circuit’s prior judgments in Jet, 
Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Systems127 and Mayer/Berkshire Corp. v. Berkshire 
Fashions, Inc.128 “squarely controlled” and supported the court’s 
finding that a claim for trademark infringement cannot bar 
trademark opposition or cancellation proceedings before the 
Board.129  Although these decisions did not address a prior dilution 
claim, the court explained that its rationale in those cases could be 
extended to the 2011 Final Dilution Judgment.130  Because the 
dilution claim also “involved a distinctly narrower set of product-
specific transactional facts than those at issue in the [TTAB] 
proceedings,” the court held that the 2011 Final Judgment on 
Dilution was similarly not claim preclusive in the TTAB 
proceedings.131  The district court case was limited to Abercrombie’s 
Ruehl line, while the Abercrombie Design Application and the 
Abercrombie Design Registration with the USPTO covered a much 
broader array of clothing goods.132  Indeed, as the Federal Circuit 
noted, Abercrombie’s refusal to extend the district court proceedings 
to cover its Gilly Hicks line of clothing evidenced the narrow scope of 
the action.133 
The Federal Circuit concluded its opinion with a reminder that if it 
had affirmed the Board’s decision that Levi Strauss was precluded 
from pursuing its challenges to Abercrombie’s registrations, such a 
decision would have required the owners of famous marks to litigate 
the full range of possible uses for the allegedly infringing mark in 
district court actions.134  Accordingly, the court held that neither issue 
preclusion nor claim preclusion prevented Levi Strauss from 
                                                          
 124. Id. at 1374. 
 125. Id. at 1372, 1374. 
 126. See id. 
 127. 223 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 128. 424 F.3d 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 129. Levi Strauss, 719 F.3d at 1374. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 1373. 
 133. Id. at 1370, 1375. 
 134. Id. at 1375. 
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challenging Abercrombie’s registrations with the USPTO and 
reversed and remanded the case for further determination of the 
Board’s proceedings.135  The remanded case is currently pending with 
the TTAB.136 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit was relatively quiet with respect to trademark 
decisions in 2013, deciding only two precedential decisions and four 
decisions in total.  Nevertheless, the court’s analyses of the TTAB’s 
decisions in these cases should be of interest to trademark 
practitioners.  On the legislative front, practitioners can look forward 
to following the progress of the proposed bill to amend the Lanham 
Act to allow for the federal registration of official government seals 
and insignia by the U.S. Government and its cities and states, in 
contrast to the Federal Circuit’s affirmation that section 2(b) 
prevents the registration of such symbols.  In addition to this 
interesting legislative development, trademark practitioners may be 
particularly likely to find the Federal Circuit’s guidance on the reach 
of claim and issue preclusion to be a helpful development where 
their administrative and civil litigation practices overlap. 
                                                          
 135. Id. at 1376. 
 136. See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., Cancellation No. 
92049913 (T.T.A.B. filed Sept. 9, 2008). 
